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Abstract 
The financial crisis of 2007/08 has demonstrated that factors for financial dis-
tress of large parts of the economy depend to a large extent on the interrela-
tions between the financial institutions. Risks threatening the financial sector 
can be decomposed into risks based in the individual factors for single institu-
tions and risks which can be attributed to the financial system as a whole. This 
part of the risks is called systemic risk. We review several approaches for 
quantifying systemic risk, most of them based on structural credit modeling.  In 
particular we present an approach which is inspired by the fact that the joint 
probability distributions can be represented by their individual marginals and 
the copula function, which represents the interrelations.  
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“Systemic risks are developments that threaten 
the stability of the financial system as a whole 
and consequently the broader economy, not just 
that of one or two institutions.” 
—Ben Bernanke, ex-chairman of the US Federal Reserve 
Bank. 
The Global financial crisis of 2007/08, often considered as the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, resulted in a change of paradigms 
in the financial and banking sector. These crisis years saw collapses of large fi-
nancial institutions, bailouts of banks by governments, and declines of stock 
markets. Triggered by the US  housing bubble, which itself was caused by giv-
ing easy access to loans for subprime borrowers, financial distress spread over 
the banking sector and led to failure of key businesses and to the 2008–2012 
global recession. Finally this also contributed to the European sovereign-debt 
crisis, with lots of aftereffects in our present times.  
Uncertainties about bank solvency, declines in credit availability and reduced 
investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets.  Governments re-
sponded with fiscal measures and institutional bailouts, which in the long term 
resulted in extreme public debts and necessary tax increases. 
This negative experience demonstrates that the economy as a whole, but espe-
cially the financial sector is subject to risks, which are grounded in the interde-
pendencies between the different economic actors and not in the performance of 
individual actors. This risk is generally phrased as “systemic risk”.  While as-
pects of systemic risk (e.g. bank run and contagion) were always an issue in dis-
cussions about the financial system, the recent crises have increased the interest 
in the topic, not only in academic circles, but also among regulators and central 
banks.  
Systemic Risk: Definitions 
If one aims at measuring – and in a further step managing and mitigating – sys-
temic risk, it is important to start with a definition. However, despite the consent 
that systemic risk is an important topic, which is reflected by an increasing 
number of related papers and technical reports, there is still not a single general-
ly accepted definition. 
As a first step, one should distinguish between systemic and systematic risk. 
Systematic risks are aggregate (macroeconomic) risks that cannot be reduced by 
hedging and diversification. Systemic risk on the other hand is a different no-
tion. It refers to the risk of breakdown or at least major dysfunction of financial 
markets. The Group of  Ten gave the following, often cited definition, see 
(Group of Ten, 2001). 
Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of eco-
nomic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainly 
about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough 
to quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy. 
Systemic risk events can be sudden and unexpected, or the likelihood of 
their occurrence can build up through time in the absence of appropriate 
policy responses. The adverse real economic effects from systemic prob-
lems are generally seen as arising from disruptions to the payment sys-
tem, to credit flows, and from the destruction of asset values. 
 This formulation describes many aspects related to systemic risk but can hardly 
be called a definition in the technical sense, as it is very broad and hard to quan-
tify. In addition, it seems to confuse cause (confidence) and consequence 
(breakdown). 
As an alternative, Kaufmann and Scott (Kaufmann & Scott, 2003) introduced 
the following definition: 
Systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns in an entire 
system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components, and 
is evidenced by co-movements among most or all the parts.  
 
In similar manner, but naming the cause and again considering larger conse-
quences, the European Central Bank (European Central Bank, 2004) defines  
Systemic risk: the risk that the inability of one institution to meet its obli-
gations when due will cause other institutions to be unable to meet their 
obligations when due. Such a failure may cause significant liquidity or 
credit problems and, as a result, could threaten the stability of or confi-
dence in markets. 
All discussed definitions focus on the banking or financial system as a whole, 
and relate systemic risk to the interconnectedness within the system. Often they 
stress the risk of spillovers from the financial sector to the real economy and the 
associated related costs. This effect is emphasized even more after the financial 
crisis, where exactly this happened: Adrian and Brunnermeier (Adrian & 
Brunnermeier, 2009) define systemic risk as 
The risk that institutional distress spreads widely and distorts the supply 
of credit  and capital to the real economy. 
 
A similar definition can be found in (Acharya, et al., 2009). 
Given the described diversity of definitions, which are similar but also different 
with respect to their focus, it is hard to develop universally accepted measures 
for systemic risk. Different definitions refer to different important nuances of 
systemic risk, which means that on the operational level a robust framework for 
monitoring and managing systemic risk should involve a variety of risk 
measures related to these different aspects.  See Hansen (Hansen, 2012) for a 
deeper discussion of the basic difficulties in defining and identifying systemic 
risk. 
In the present chapter we will focus on the first part of the definition by 
(Kaufmann & Scott, 2003), which summarizes the most important aspect of sys-
tematic risk in financial systems, without addressing more general economic as-
pects. Such an approach could be seen as “systemic risk in the narrow sense” 
and we state it (slightly modified) as follows: 
Systemic risk is the risk of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to break-
downs in individual parts or components. 
Three issues have to be substantiated, if one wants to apply such a definition in 
concrete situations. 
The system: In financial applications the focus lies on parts of the financial sys-
tem (like the banking system, insurance, hedge funds) or the financial system as 
a whole. Any analysis has to start with describing the agents (e.g. banks in the 
banking system) within the analyzed system. This involves their assets and lia-
bilities and the main risk factors related to profit and loss.  
For a systemic view it is important that the agents are not isolated entities at all. 
Systematic risk can be modeled by joint risk factors, influencing all profit and 
losses. Systemic risk in financial systems usually comes by mutual debt between 
the entities and the related leverage.  
Breakdowns: In single period models breakdown is related to bankruptcy in a 
technical sense, i.e. that the asset value of an agent at the end of the period does 
not reach a certain level, e.g. is not sufficient to pay back the agents debt. A 
lower boundary than debt can be used to reflect the fact that confidence into a 
bank might fade away even before bankruptcy, which severely reduces confi-
dence between banks. In a systemic view it is not sufficient to look at break-
downs of individual agents: relevant are events that lead to the breakdown of 
more than one agent.  
Risk: Risk is the danger that unwanted events (here: breakdowns) may happen 
or that developments go in an unintended direction. Quantifiable risk is de-
scribed by distributions arising from risk. For financial systems this may involve 
the probability of breakdowns or the distribution of payments necessary to bring 
back asset values to an acceptable level. Risk measures summarize favorable or 
unfavorable properties of such distributions. 
It should be mentioned that such an approach assumes that a good distributional 
model for the relevant risk factors can be formulated and estimated. During this 
chapter we will stick to exactly this assumption. However it is clear that in prac-
tice it is often difficult to come up with good models and data availability might 
be severely restricted: additional risk (model risk) is related to the quality of the 
used models and estimations, see (Hansen, 2012) for a deeper discussion of this 
point. 
 
From Structural Models to Systemic 
Risk 
Structural models for default go back to (Merton, 2009)  and build on the idea 
that default of a firm happens if the firm’s assets are insufficient to cover con-
tractual obligations (liabilities).  Simple models (e.g. (Merton, 2009) ) start by 
modeling a single firm in the framework of the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model, whereas more complex models extend the framework to multivariate 
formulations, usually based on correlations between the individual asset values. 
A famous example is Vasiceks asymptotic single factor model (see (Vasicek, 
1987), (Vasicek, 1991) and (Vasicek, 2002)), which is very stylized but leads to 
a closed form solution. 
In most structural default models it is not possible to calculate the portfolio loss 
explicitly; hence Monte-Carlo simulation is an important tool for default calcu-
lations.  Even then the models usually make simplifying assumptions.   
Consider a system consisting of k  economic entities, e.g. banks, and let 
1 2( ), ( ), , ( )kt A t AA t  denote the asset processes, i.e. the asset values at time t  for 
the individual entities. Furthermore, for each entity i  a limit iD , the distress bar-
rier, defines default in the following sense: default occurs if the asset value of 
entity i  falls below the distress barrier, i.e.  
 ( )i iA t D .  (2.1)  
The relation between asset value and distress barrier is usually closely related to 
leverage, i.e. the ratio between debt and equity.  
Finally, let 1 2( ), ( ), , ( )kt X t XX t  with  
 ( ) ( )i i iAX t t D    (2.2) 
denote the distance to default of the individual entities.  Note that alternatively 
the distance to default can also be defined in terms of ( )iX t  as a percentage of 
asset value, divided by the asset volatility, see e.g. (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003).  
In a one period setup – as used throughout this chapter - one is interested at val-
ues ( ), (X )i iTA T   at time T , the end of the planning horizon.  Analyzing systemic 
risk then means analyzing the joint distribution of the distances to default ( )iX t , 
in particular  their negative parts  ( ) max ( ),0i iT XX T   , and the underlying 
random risk factors are described by the joint distribution of asset values ( )iA T .  
Many approaches for modeling the asset values exist in literature. In a classical 
finance setup one would use correlated geometric Brownian motions resulting in 
correlated log-normal distributions for the asset values at the end of the planning 
horizon. Segoviano Basurto proposes a Bayesian approach (Segoviano Basurto, 
2006), for applications see also (Jin & Nadal de Simone, 2013). In the present 
paper we will use copula based models, as discussed later. 
The second component of the approach, the distress barrier, is in the simplest 
case (Merton, 2009) modeled just by the face value of overall debt for each enti-
ty. Other approaches distinguish between short term and long term debt (longer 
than the planning horizon). Usually this is done by adding some reasonable frac-
tion of long term debt to the full amount of short term debt, see e.g. (Servigny & 
Renault, 2007).  
Still such classical credit default models (see e.g. (Guerra, et al., 2013)), alt-
hough classified as systemic risk models, neglect an important aspect: economic 
entities like banks are mutually indebted and each amount of debt is shown as 
liability for one entity, but also as asset for another entity. Default of one entity 
(a reduction in liabilities) may trigger subsequent defaults of other entities by 
reducing their asset values.  We call such models systemic models in the strict 
sense. 
Such approaches with mutual debt have been proposed e.g. in (Chan-Lau, et al., 
2009 B) or (Chan-Lau, et al., 2009 A). Models neglecting this aspect are system-
ic models in a broad sense; in fact they are restricted to the effects of systematic 
risk related to asset values. 
The basic setup of systemic models in the strict sense can be described as fol-
lows:  Let 0ijH denote the amount of debt between entities i   and j , i.e. the 
amount of money borrowed by entity i  from entity j .  We also include debt to 
the non-bank sector, denoted by iH  for each entity i  and credit iC  to the non-
banking sector, both repayable (including interest) at the end of the planning 
horizon, time T . Furthermore, ( )iS T  is the value at time T  of other financial as-
sets hold by entity i . Then the asset value of entity i  at the end of the planning 
horizon is given by 
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and the distance to default can be written as 
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The random factors are the values ( )iS T  of financial assets, and (in an extended 
model) the credits iC  from outside the system, payable back at time  
Again one could stop at this point and analyze the distances to default 0iX , re-
spectively the sum of all individual distances to default in the framework of 
classical default models.  Systemic models in the strict sense however go farther. 
Consider now all entities in distress (defaulted banks), i.e.  0 ( ) 0: TD iI i X  . 
Each of these entities is closed down and the related debt has to be adjusted, be-
cause entity i  cannot fully pay back its debts. In a simple setup this can be done 
by reducing all debts to other entities to 
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Here, the factor  
  0 0ii iLGD X D   (2.8) 
is an estimate for the loss given default of entity i .  
It is now possible to calculate new asset values, new distress barriers and new 
distances to default, after the default of all entities in 0DI . For this purpose we 
replace in (2.3)-(2.5)  all occurrences of  0ijH  by 1ijH  and all occurrences of  0iH  
by 1iH .  This first default triggers further ones and starts a loss cascade: It may 
happen that after the first adjustment step new defaults can be observed, which 
results in a new set of bankrupt entities 1DI  after the second round. In addition, 
bankruptcy of additional entities may reduce even further the insolvent assets of 
entities that already defaulted in the first round. 
This process can be continued, leading to new values ( ), ( ), (, )k k ki ij i kiX AT H T D T  and 
a augmented set kDI  of defaulted entities after each iteration k . The loss cascade 
terminates, when no additional entity is sent to bankruptcy in step k , i.e. 1k kD DI I  .   
The sequences kijH    and kiH    of debt are nonincreasing in k  and furthermore 
are bounded from below by zero values for all components, which implies con-
vergence of debt. At this point we have 
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This system describes the relation between the positive and negative parts of the 
distances to default ( ) ( ) ( )i i iT X T X TX    for all entities i . It holds with proba-
bility 1 for all entities. Note that previous literature, e.g. (Chan-Lau, et al., 2009 
B) or (Chan-Lau, et al., 2009 A), uses fixed numbers instead of the estimated 
loss given defaults in (2.9). 
In fact, the system  (2.9)  is ambiguous and we search for the smallest solution, 
i.e. the optimization problem 
 ( )min ( )
to (2.9)
X T i
iX T
subject
   E   (2.10) 
has to be solved in order to obtain the correct estimates for ( )iX T   and ( )iX T  .  
This basic setup can be easily extended to deal with different definitions of the 
distress barrier, involving early warning barriers, or accounting for different 
types of debt, e.g. short term and long term as above. 
Measuring systemic risk 
The distances to default, derived from structural models, in particular from sys-
temic models in the strict sense, can be used to measure systemic risk. In princi-
ple the joint distribution of distances to default for all involved entities contains 
(together with the definition of distress barriers) all the relevant information. We 
assume that the joint distribution is continuous and let 1 2,( ) ( , ), kxp x p x x   de-
note the joint density of the distances to default 1 2( ), ( ) (, )X, kT X TX T  for all enti-
ties. 
Note that the risk measures discussed in the following are often defined in terms 
of asset value, which is fully appropriate for systemic models in the broader 
sense. In view of the above discussion of systemic models in the strict sense, we 
instead prefer to use the distances to default or loss variables derived from the 
distance to default.  
The first group of risk measures is based directly on unconditional and condi-
tional default probabilities. See (Guerra, et al., 2013) for an overview of such 
measures. The simplest approach considers the individual distress probabilities 
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The term in squared brackets is the marginal density of ( )iX T , which means that 
it is not necessary to estimate the joint density for this measure. In similar man-
ner one can consider joint distributions for any subset  1, ,I k   of entities by 
using the related (joint) marginal density ( )Ip x , which can be obtained by inte-
grating the joint density ( )p x   over all other entities, i.e. j I .  
Joint probabilities of distress for a subset I  can be achieved by 
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where the set I  contains the elements 1 2, , , Iki i i . Of special interest are the de-
fault probabilities of pairs of entities, see e.g. (Guerra, et al., 2013). Joint proba-
bilities of distress describe tail risk within the chosen set I . If I  represents the 
whole system, i.e. it contains all the entities, then the joint probability of distress 
can be considered as tail risk measure for systemic risk, see e.g. (Segoviano & 
Goodhart, 2009). 
Closely related are conditional probabilities of distress, i.e. the probability that 
entity j  is in distress, given that entity j  is in distress, which can be written as 
 { , }| ( 0 | ) 0)( ) (j i
D
i jD
j i D
i
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P P X T
P
X T    . (3.3) 
These conditional probabilities can be presented by a matrix with |Dj iP  as its ij -th 
matrix element, the distress dependency matrix.  
While conditional distress probabilities contain important information, it should 
be noted, that they only reflect the two dimensional marginal distributions. Con-
ditional probabilities are often used for analyzing the interlinkage of the system 
and the likelihood of contagion. However, such arguments should not be carried 
to extremes: finally, conditional probabilities do not contain any information 
about causality. 
Another systemic measure related to probabilities is the probability of at least 
one distressed entity; see e.g. (Segoviano & Goodhart, 2009) for an application 
to a small system of four entities. It can be calculated as  
 11 1 ( 0, , 0)kP P X X     (3.4) 
(Guerra, et al., 2013) propose a asset-value-weighted average of individual 
probabilities of distress as an upper bound for the probability of at least one dis-
tressed entity. Probabilities of exact one, two or another number of distressed 
entities are hard to calculate for large systems because of the large number of 
combinatorial possibilities. 
An important measure that bases on probabilities is the banking stability index, 
measuring the expected number of entities in distress, given that at least one en-
tity is in distress. This measure can be written as 
 1 1
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 . (3.5) 
Other systemic risk measures base directly on the distribution of distances to 
default. (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2009)  propose a measure called conditional-
value-at risk1,CoVaR  . It is closely related to value at risk, which is the main 
risk measure for banks under the Basel accord. 
CoVaR is based on conditional versions of the quantile at level    for an entity 
j given that  entity i  reaches the  -quantile. In terms of distances to default this 
reads 
   , ( ) (( | ) i ) (Xnf : | ( ))ij iP X T T V aC oV RaR j i X T           , (3.6) 
where 
   ( ) inf : ( )iVaR i P X T        . (3.7) 
                                                            
1 Conditional‐value‐at risk should not be confused with general risk measure with the same name, which is also 
known as expected tail loss or average value at risk. 
The contribution of entity i  to the risk of entity j  then is calculated as 
 , 0.5,0.5( | i) ( | ) ( | )CoVaR j CoVaR j i CoVaR j i       ,  (3.8) 
i.e. the conditional value at risk at level   is compared to the conditional value 
at risk at the median level. From all the ( | )CoVaR j i  values,  it is possible to 
construct another kind of dependency matrix. 
This idea can also be applied to the system as a whole: if ( )jX T is replaced by 
1
( )( )
k
i
i
TX T X

  , the distance to default of the whole system, (3.6)-(3.8)   leads to 
a quantity ( | )CoVaR j i   that measures the impact of entity i  on the system. In 
this way one is able to analyze notions like “too big to fail” or “too intercon-
nected to fail”. 
In contrast to probability based measures, CoVaR  emphasizes the role of poten-
tial monetary losses. This approach can be carried forward, leading to the idea 
that systemic risk should be related to the losses arising from adverse events. 
Given a model for the distances to default ( )iX T , the overall loss of the system 
can be written as 
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   . (3.9) 
totL  covers all credit losses in the whole system, both from interbank credits and 
from credits to the public. 
From the viewpoint of a state this notion of total loss may be seen as too exten-
sive. One may argue that only losses guaranteed by the state are really relevant. 
Definition (3.9) therefore depicts a situation in which a state guarantees all debt 
in the system, which can be considered as unrealistic. However in most devel-
oped countries the state guarantees saving deposits to a high extend, and anyhow 
society as a whole will have to bear the consequences of lost debt from outside 
the banking system. Therefore a further notion of loss is given by 
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which describes the amount of lost non-banking debt. For model (2.9) loss given 
default is given by (2.8). 
In general, the notion of loss depends on the exact viewpoint (loss to whom). 
We will therefore use the symbol L  to represent any kind of loss variable in the 
following discussion of systemic risk measures.  
An obvious measure is expected loss, i.e. the (discounted) expectation of the risk 
variable L . For simple structural models like (2.2) this measure can be calculated 
from the marginal distribution of asset values, respectively of distances to de-
fault. Modeling the joint distributions is not necessary. Note that this is different 
for the strict systemic model (2.9).  
The expectation can be calculated with respect to an observed (estimated) mod-
el, or with respect to a risk neutral (martingale) model. Using observed probabil-
ities may account insufficiently for risk, which contradicts the aim of systemic 
risk measurement. Using risk neutral valuation seems reasonable from a finance 
point of view and has been used e.g. in (Gray & Jobst, 2010) or (Gray, et al., 
2010). However it should be kept in mind that the usual assumptions underlying 
contingent claims analysis, in particular that the acting investor is a price taker, 
are not valid if the investor has to hedge the whole financial system, which 
clearly would be the case when hedging the losses related to systemic risk. 
Using expectation and the concept of loss cascades, (Cont, et al., 2010) define a 
Contagion Index  as follows: they define first the total loss of a loss cascade 
triggered by a default of entity i  and the contagion index of entity i  as the ex-
pected total loss conditioned on all scenarios which trigger the default of entity i
.    
Clearly the expectation does not fully account for risk. An obvious idea is to 
augment expectation by some risk measure  , which, with weight a , leads to  
    ( )L E L a L   . (3.11) 
Typical choices of  are dispersion measures like the variance or the standard 
deviation. Such measures are examples of classical premium calculation princi-
ples in insurance. Further, more general premium calculation principles are e.g. 
the distortion principle or the Esscher premium principle. For an overview on 
insurance pricing see e.g. (Furmann & Zitikis, 2008). In the context of systemic 
risk, the idea to use insurance premiums was proposed in (Huang, et al., 2009). 
In this paper empirical methods were used for extracting an insurance premium 
from high frequency credit default swap data. Even more general, it should be 
noted that any monetary risk measure, in particular coherent measures of risk, 
can be applied to the overall loss in a system. See (Kovacevic & Pflug, 2014) for 
an overview and references. 
In this broad framework, an important class of risk measures is given by the 
quantiles of the loss variable L : 
  ( ) inf :Q L l P L l    .  (3.12) 
With probability   the loss will not higher than the related quantile.  
Quantiles are closely related to the value-at-risk (VaR), which measures quan-
tiles for the deviation of the loss from the expected loss. Note the slight differ-
ence between (3.12) and (3.7), because (3.7) is stated in terms of distance to de-
fault and (3.12) in terms of loss.  
( )Q L  can also be interpreted in an economic way as follows. Assume that a 
fund is build up in order to cover systemic losses in the banking system. If we 
ask the question, how large the fund should be such that it is not exhausted with 
probability   over the planning period, then the answer will be ( )LQ  . This idea 
can also be reversed. Assume now that a fund of size q  has been accumulated to 
deal with systemic losses. Then the probability that the fund is not exhausted , 
i.e. 
  ( )L qF q P L    (3.13) 
is a reasonable systemic risk measure. Clearly, ( )LF q  is the distribution function 
of the loss and q  is the quantile at level ( )LF q .   
Unfortunately, quantiles do not contain any information about those (1 )100 
percent cases, in which the loss lies above the quantile. Two different distribu-
tions, which are equal in their negative tails, but very different in the positive 
tails, are treated equally.  
The average value-at-risk (AVaR) avoids some drawbacks of quantiles. It is de-
fined for a parameter α, which again is called level. The AVaR averages the bad 
scenario,  
    |AVaR L E L L Q L      . (3.14) 
The latter formula justifies the alternative name conditional value-at-risk 
(CVaR), which is frequently used particularly in finance. In insurance, the 
AVaR is known as conditional tail expectation or expected tail loss. 
The effect of individual banks can be analyzed in obvious manner by defining 
conditional versions of the quantile or AVaR  loss measures,  i.e. by conditioning 
the overall loss on the distance to default of an individual bank in the style of 
CoVaR , see (3.6) above. 
Systemic Risk and Copula Models  
The distinction between risk factors which are related to individual performanc-
es and risk factors which are a consequence of the interrelations of the economic 
agents has its parallel in a similar distinction for probability distributions or sto-
chastic processes: 
Suppose that     1 ,   kX t X t    describe the performance processes of  k eco-
nomic agents. The individual  (marginal)  processes are assumed to follow cer-
tain stochastic models as discrete Markov processes,  diffusion models or jump-
diffusion models. The joint distribution however depends on the copula process, 
which links the marginal processes.   
To simplify, suppose only a single-period model is considered and that the per-
formance  after one period is 1, kX X  . If this vector has marginal cumulative 
distribution functions 1, , kF F    (meaning that    i iP X u F u  ), then the joint 
distribution of the whole vector can be represented  by 
       1 1 1 1, , , ,k k k kP X u X u C F u F u      , (3.15) 
where  C is called the copula function.  Typical  families of copula functions are 
the  normal copula, the Clayton copula, the Gumbel copula or – more generally 
– the group of  Archimedean copulas.  
While the marginal distributions describe the individual performances, the copu-
la function models the interrelations between them and can thus be seen as rep-
resenting the systemic component. In particular,  the relation between underper-
formance of  agent i and agent j can be described on the basis of  the copula.  To 
this end, we use the notion of  conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR), see above. 
Following (Mainink & Schaaning, 2014) we use the notations 
    , | ( | )CoVaR Y X VaR Y X VaR X       
for the notion of Conditional Value-at-Risk introduced by (Adrian & 
Brunnermeier, 2009)  and   
    , | ( | )CoVaR Y X VaR Y X VaR X      
for the variant introduced by (Girardi & Ergün, 2012). Keep in mind that we 
work here with profit&loss variables and not with pure loss variables.   The lat-
ter variant  can be expressed in terms of the conditional copula   
  | ( , ) ( , )( )V U
P V u U C vC v
P U
 
 
   . 
Its inverse  
    1| |inf{ : }V U V UC v C v       
and the marginal distribution of  X   can be used to write the CoVaR  in the fol-
lowing way:  
     1 1,  || .X V UCoVaR Y X F C       
For the   , |CoVaR Y X   the conditional copula 
  | ( , )V UC v C vv 
   
is needed. With 
    1| |inf{ : }V U V UC v C v       
one gets 
     1 1, || .X V UCoVaR Y X F C        
Notice that both notions of  CoVaR  depend only on the copula and the marginal 
distribution of  X.      
If underperformance of an agent means that its performance falls below an α-
quantile, then   | ( , )V U CC       
indicates the probability that  also the other agent underperforms.   , |i jCoVaR X X   gives the necessary risk reserve for agent i to survive a possible 
default of agent j. For a system of  k agents, the notion of  ,CoVaR   can be gen-
eralized in a straightforward manner to k components.  
Example 1.  Consider a financial institution A, which faces a gamma-distributed 
loss with mean 10 and variance 20. Then A’s unconditional 99% VaR is 23.8. 
If A’s performance  related to B’s performance  with a normal copula with cor-
relation ρ, then  A’s conditional VaR (the CoVaR) increases with increasing ρ, 
see the table below. 
ρ 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.8 
CoVaR0.99,0.99 23.8 26.6 30.0 31.4 
Table 1. 
Example 2. Consider a system of  7 banks, where the performances , 1,..,7iX i   
are related by a normal copula stemming from a correlation matrix with all off-
diagonal elements  ρ (the diagonal elements are 1).  Suppose that the first bank 
defaults if its performance drops below the 5% quantile.  Given the copula one 
may determine the number of  other  banks which also fall below the 5% quan-
tile, i.e. default as a consequence of the first banks’s default. The following pic-
tures show the distribution of  these  numbers for the choice of 
0, 0.2, 0.5        and 0.8  . One may observe that in the independent case (
0  ) the other banks are practically not affected by the default of one bank, 
while for higher correlated cases a contagion effect to other banks can be easily 
seen. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2. 
 
A very interdependent banking system carries a high systemic risk. It has there-
fore been proposed to limit the dependencies by creating quite independent sub-
systems. The following Example gives an evidence for this argument.  
Example 3.  Here we consider 7 banks each of which has a performance given 
by a negative gamma distribution with mean 100 and variance 200, but shifted 
such that with probability 5% a negative performance happens, which means 
bankruptcy. The total losses of the system are calculated on the basis of  a nor-
mal copula linking the individual losses.  By assuming that  the government  (or 
the tax payer)  takes responsibility for covering total losses up to the 99% quan-
tile,  this quantile (the 99% VaR) can be seen as a quantization of the systemic 
risk.  
In the following pictures, we show in the upper half a visualization of the corre-
lations (which determine the normal copula) by the thickness of the arcs con-
necting the 7 nodes representing the  banks. The lower half shows the distribu-
tion of the total systemic losses, where also the 99%VaR is indicated.   As one 
can see, the higher correlation increases the systemic risk. If the system is divid-
ed into independent subsystems, the systemic risk decreases.   
 
 
Figure 3. Left: all banks are independent, VaR0.99=25  
Right: all correlations are 0.2  , VaR0.99=29 
  
Figure 4. Left: all correlations are  0.5  , VaR0.99=41  
Right: all correlations are 0.8  , VaR0.99=57 
 
 
Figure 5. The system consists of two independent subsystems with internal cor-
relations ρ. Left:  0.2  , VaR0.99=28; Right: 0.5  , VaR0.99=35 
 
Figure 6. The system consists of two independent subsystems with internal cor-
relations ρ. Left:  0.8  , VaR0.99=44; Right: one subsystem has 0.2  ,  
the other 0.8  , VaR0.99=32 
Conclusions 
Systemic financial risk is an important issue in view of the distress the banking 
systems all over the world has experienced in the recent years of crises. Even if 
breakdowns are prevented by the government, the related societal costs are ex-
tremely high. 
We described the measurement of systemic risk, based on the structural ap-
proach originating from structural credit risk models. In particular the cascading 
effects which are caused by mutual debt between the individual banks in the sys-
tem were analyzed in detail. Furthermore we related the notion of systemic risk 
to the copula structure, modeling dependency between the performances of the 
individual banks. The effects of different levels of dependency on the total sys-
temic risk in terms of the value at risk of total losses were demonstrated by ex-
amples.    
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